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1 Introduction
Innovation in information and communication technology (IT) has triggered a period of
rapid technological change. The share of computers in capital formation increased
dramatically as cheaper IT components stimulated progress in IT equipment production
and, through rapidly falling prices, spurred IT use in other sectors. Massive investment
in IT, as a new general purpose technology, and its application in traditional industries,
has been seen as a core element of a ‘new economy’ with higher aggregate productivity
growth not limited to the IT sector. For the United States, the acceleration of total factor
productivity outside the IT sector has been seen as indicative of such spillover effects
(see, for example, Jorgenson 2001; Oliner and Sichel 2000; for the opposing view see
Gordon 2000). For Europe, there is as yet only scarce evidence for spillover effects to
other sectors (see, eg., European Central Bank 2001; Oulton 2001).
The debate about macroeconomic productivity effects reinforced the interest in the
microeconomic changes brought by IT. That computers enable new ways of organizing
firms has been a major theme in the field of information systems. The rapidly growing
empirical economic literature looking into firm-level changes associated with the use of
IT supports the view that efficiency gains are positively correlated with investments in
‘organizational capital’. Micro-based studies identify complementarities between the
use of IT and firm reorganization as important in the United States (eg., Black and
Lynch 2000)—and in Europe too—in traditional sectors such as textile manufacturing
(Bugamelli and Pagano 2001).
The question of if and how IT progress affects the risk profile of firms has received less
attention than the productivity effects of IT. However, the literature on closely related
issues has grown rapidly. Several studies document the high volatility of stocks of IT
sector firms. For example, Fornari and Pericoli (2001) form small portfolios of IT- and
non-IT equities and show greater sensitivity of technology equities to shocks. A large
body of literature deals with the specifics of new and innovative firms, developing a
new technology in an unexplored market (see Bank of England 2001 for an overview).
Available evidence broadly supports the view that investment in the innovative sector is
inherently more risky than in rather mature markets (eg., Chan et al. 1999 show that
return volatility is positively correlated with R&D intensity).
The dispersion of IT throughout the productive system could also affect the risk profile
of firms in many other sectors. Bugamelli et al. (2002) note that the uncertainty implied
by investment in IT capital is similar to that in any large process innovation, because
reorganizing productive activities to fully exploit IT-related benefits can imply huge
sunk costs. In addition, IT innovation may alter the competitiveness of markets in ways
that are difficult to predict. IT provides firms with powerful tools for more effective
price discrimination (Varian 2001) because it allows the ‘personalization’ of goods
through highly flexible production processes. It also enables firms to collect and process
the information necessary to identify consumer taste. Moreover, supply side and
demand side economies of scale (‘network effects’) create the possibility of boosting
profits by increasing supply at very small marginal costs and by achieving a ‘critical
mass’ in demand. Changes in the risk profile are not necessarily limited to firms
adopting IT. A study by Baldwin and Sabourin (2001) on the Canadian manufacturing
sector suggests that IT innovation has repercussions on firms not adapting to new
technologies by eroding their competitiveness.2
Many of the IT-related innovations in firm organization, production and marketing not
only suggest that business risk increases, but also that risk becomes more firm specific
(‘idiosyncratic’). In firm organization and production, greater idiosyncratic risk could be
a side effect of an increasing importance of ‘soft’ production factors as information and
knowledge that are highly firm specific. Moreover, the productivity of these factors
depends on firm organization supporting the exploration of factor complementarities.
Market segmentation through the sale of different versions of basically the same product
and, at the extreme end, the production of goods tailored to the preferences of individual
customers, could also make risk more firm specific.
Separate from this, IT could alter the assessment and perception of firm-specific risk by
investors in financial markets. This could happen through the changing quality of
corporate information, namely its timeliness and its reliability. First, the use of IT
allows disseminating information far more rapidly. This should basically reduce the
volatility of returns as information arrives earlier, that is when the cash flows in
question are more heavily discounted (Campbell et al. 2001). Second, as a consequence
of IT-related innovation, substantially more information in usable form about
production processes, risks and departures from plans is potentially available. This
could facilitate the formation of expectations and reduce volatility through improved
monitoring. However, this requires that the benefits of improved monitoring capabilities
be passed on to external stakeholders (Committee in the Global Financial System 2002).
From the perspective of corporate finance, a broad-based increase in firm-specific risk
would be important, as higher idiosyncratic risk puts greater onus on portfolio
diversification and risk management by financial investors. Although idiosyncratic risk
can be diversified, a broader range of assets may be required to achieve diversification,
and exploiting the potential for risk diversification may require adjustments of existing
portfolios. IT is of interest as a factor driving idiosyncratic risk because of its potential
to affect simultaneously a very broad range of industries inside and outside the IT
sector. Moreover, the complementary character of IT investment may fundamentally
change the nature of established businesses, thereby going far beyond the ‘normal’
innovation process. Hence, risk management issues arising from higher idiosyncratic
risk might be relevant for a broad range of financial investors and intermediaries.
This paper examines trends in idiosyncratic risk in different ‘new economy’ and ‘old
economy’ industries and explores whether these developments can be attributed to the
use of IT. Against the background of these results, it raises possible implications for
public policy. The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the
methodology and the data employed to measure idiosyncratic risk. The third part
discusses the empirical results. Section four considers possible implications for financial
policy. Section five concludes.
2 Methodology and data
2.1 Methodology
Idiosyncratic risk is usually measured as volatility of the asset-specific return (see, for
example, Richards 1999 for different measures of idiosyncratic risk and Malkiel and Xu
2000). This paper employs the CAPM-based approach suggested by Campbell et al.3
(2001) to decompose equity returns into market and idiosyncratic volatility. This
approach appears advantageous for two reasons. First, returns can be split into market,
industry and firm-specific components. The possibility of distinguishing between
sectoral and firm-specific risk is useful when drawing conclusions about the possible
impact of IT innovation on idiosyncratic risk. Second, this approach yields a volatility
measure of firms in different sectors without having to keep track of covariances and to
estimate firm-level betas.
Let rmt, rit, and rfit denote excess returns of the market portfolio m, the industry i, and a
firm f in the industry i at period t. According to the CAPM, common and asset-specific
excess return at the industry and the firm level can be written as
it mt im it r r ε β + = (1)
fit it fi fit r r η β + = (2)
(1) substituted into (2) yields:
fit it fi mt im fi fit r r η ε β β β + + = (3)
This decomposition guarantees that the different components of a firm’s return are
orthogonal to each other. It permits a variance decomposition in which all covariance
terms are zero.
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However, the drawback of this approach is that it requires estimation of industry and
firm-level betas, which may be unstable particularly at the firm level. One possibility to
circumvent this problem is to simplify the model by setting beta = 1 as suggested by
Richards [1999] for a simple proxy of idiosyncratic risk). Another approach is to
calculate asset specific volatilities as the weighted average of the volatility of all assets
in a portfolio instead of the volatility of one individual asset. Here, the weighted asset-
specific beta = 1 (i.e., the beta of the portfolio).
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Hence, a market-adjusted return model (Campbell et al. 1997) can be used as basis for
the estimation of returns and volatilities at the industry level:
it mt it r r ε~ + =  (7)
and at the firm level:
fit it fit r r η~ + = . (8)
From substituting (1) into (7) and (8), one obtains:4
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fit w β  for the firms in a specific industry, the weighted industry and firm-level
variances obtained from (7) and (8) are
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Finally, we can substitute (11) into (12), which yields the beta-free variance
decomposition
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2.2 Data and estimation
Equity returns are daily returns for firms included in the Datastream (DS) total market
indices for the United States and the European Union. The indices comprise 996 firms
for the US market and 2,055 for the EU, 15 in 36 industries. Industries are aggregated
according to the constituents of the DS level 4 sector indices. Total market and industry
indices are weighted by the market capitalization of individual firms at the end of the
respective day. The safe interest rate over which excess returns are calculated is the
three-month treasury bill rate for the US market and the three-month euro interbank
deposit rate for Europe. Data frequency is daily for the period from January 1990 until
December 2001.
Firm-specific volatilities are calculated for ten industries in the United States and in the
European Union, including those with the largest average market capitalization and the
‘new economy’ sectors (see Table 1). In order to isolate effects arising from changing
index constituencies, two series are calculated for each industry. The constant
constituent series comprises firms contained in the respective DS sector over the whole
time horizon from 1990-2001. The varying constituent series is calculated using the
actual index constituents at each day. Hence, it includes new firms that went public
during the 1990s. If not explicitly stated, figures are based on the actual constituent
series.
Daily excess returns for the total market, for industries and for firms are calculated as
the differences in log returns of the respective equity and the safe rate. Monthly5
volatilities at the different levels are estimated as follows (see Campbell et al. 2001).
For the total market M, that is
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Corresponding to the construction of market volatility as the sum of squared deviations
from the mean market return over a month, industry-specific volatility I is estimated as
the weighted sum of squared residuals over the sample period.
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Finally, firm-specific volatility is also estimated as weighted sum of squared residuals
of the firms in the respective industry over the sample period.
2 2 ˆ ˆ fit
s t i f
fit
i
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= =  (16)
Calculating firm-specific risk for individual industries FI requires the estimation of
industry betas on the market. The betas are estimated using OLS of the daily excess
return data for the full sample. Hence it is assumed that the betas are constant over time:
2 2 ˆ ˆ fit
s t i f
fit is s w FI η σ η  
∈ ∈
= = . (17)
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3.1 Aggregate trends
Figure 1 shows market, industry and firm-specific volatilities as constructed form
equations 14, 15 and 16. The three variance components exhibit a marked difference
between a rather ‘calm’ period in the early and mid-1990s and a time of relatively high
volatility beginning in late 1998. This pattern is very similar for the United States and
for Europe. Market volatility moves differently from other components in the early
1990s – when firm and industry volatilities remained low – and in 1997, when it picked
up earlier than firm and industry volatility. As one would expect, market volatility is
particularly sensitive to shocks to general market sentiment as in the context of the Gulf
crisis in 1990, the Asian crisis in 1997 or LTCM in 1998 (see bottom panel of Figure 1).
In relative terms, it is striking that firm-specific volatility was more than twice as high
as that of industries and the overall market. In relative terms, volatility at the firm level
accounted for 70 per cent of total return volatility in the United States and 72 per cent in
Europe.
No clear picture emerges with respect to volatility trends during the 1990s. Visual
inspection gives the impression that any trend in industry and firm-specific volatility is
dominated by the period of high volatility beginning in autumn 1998. The first spike in
volatility at all three levels in 1998 coincides with the correction in equity prices during
the LTCM crisis. One explanation for the simultaneous jump in volatility at all levels
could be (temporary) concerns about the systemic impact of the turbulences. However,6
volatility remained at elevated levels even through the 1999/2000 bull market. Industry
and firm-specific risk peaked in spring 2000, when the decline of tech sector equities
began, and again in the late 2000 in the US market, when evidence of an economic
slowdown mounted. In 2001, industry- and firm-level volatility has receded, but was
still relatively high by the end of 2001. Taken together, the persistence of high volatility
since late 1998 could be indicative of a shift in the volatility regime in addition to
possible long-term trend and cyclical variations.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and the results of linear regressions testing for the
existence of a deterministic trend, a structural break in 1998 and the influence of
cyclical fluctuations in real activity.1 The results clearly show that the volatility of the
average firm is much higher than that of the average sector and the overall market both
in the United States and in Europe. The deterministic trend, which is significant for all
components and markets when used as the only right-hand variable (model I), remains
significant only for US industries and firms when introducing a structural break in
autumn 1998 (model II). Model III, which includes a ‘production gap’ variable for
cyclical fluctuations, yields significant results for Europe only at industry level.2 For the
United States, the production gap has explanatory power for industry and firm-level
volatility in addition to the trend and the structural break variable.
Taken together, three stylized facts, and issues arising from these, can be highlighted
from the analysis of aggregate timeseries for market industry and firm-level volatility.
The increase in firm-specific volatility in the late 1990s coincides with the sharp rise
and subsequent decline of IT equity prices. Is idiosyncratic risk therefore a genuine IT
story in a sense that it is attributable to the weight of the IT sector in the overall equity
market?
Most of the upward shift in firm-specific volatility occurred abruptly in 1998. Does this
reflect a change in the financial market perception of firm-specific risk? Or is it
indicative of actual changes in the production function and/or the competitiveness of
individual firms or industries, which could be expected to impact on idiosyncratic risk
gradually and over an extended period of time?
A trend increase in idiosyncratic risk is observable in the United States. Is this related to
IT-driven permanent changes in economic activity?
The following section addresses these questions by analysing the pattern of
idiosyncratic risk of firms in individual industries.
3.2 Individual industries
Figure 2 plots firm-level volatilities for different industries in the United States and in
Europe. It exhibits a clear distinction between ‘new economy’ industries (information
                                                
1  The regressions were run using volatility levels. The hypothesis of a unit root in volatility levels could
be rejected at the 5% level for all series.
2  The variable captures cyclical influences as trend deviations. It is estimated as the residuals of a HP
filter smoothing of monthly data on industrial production. For the residual series, the hypothesis of a
unit root could also be rejected at the 5% level.7
technology hardware and software, telecom services, and media; and pharmaceuticals
and biotech) and companies in the ‘old economy’. Firms in all sectors considered here
experienced an increase in idiosyncratic risk in the late 1990s. However, the jump in
volatility was much more pronounced in the ‘new economy’. In contrast to this,
idiosyncratic risk of firms in more traditional industries (in particular banks, insurance
and oil and gas) increased only temporarily in 1998 and 1999 but returned to the earlier
levels relatively quickly.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and the structural break coefficients for model II in
Table 2 for the individual industries. The coefficient for the structural break is
significant for all ‘new economy’ sectors. The coefficients show that idiosyncratic risk
virtually doubled relative to the mean for firms in the hardware and software producing
industries and in the media sector in the United States and in Europe and for European
telecoms. The largest relative increase is reported for the US telecom sector.
Turning to the ‘old economy’ industries, the relatively strong rise in idiosyncratic risk in
the United States and European retail sectors stands out. One IT-related explanation
could be the dramatic change in the competitive environment in parts of the retail sector
as a consequence of e-commerce. In contrast to this, the change in firm-specific
volatility of oil and gas producers, banks, insurance firms and car manufacturers is
moderate.
The sectoral breakdown clearly supports the view that the rise in idiosyncratic risk was
particularly pronounced in the IT sector. The aggregation of firm-specific risk across
industries following equation (17) implies that the high volatility translates into high
overall firm-specific volatilities according to the high weight of the IT sector (see
Table 3).
An additional question is whether the increase in firm-specific volatility in the IT sector
is attributable to the young and innovative firms that went public during the 1990s.
Several factors can explain particularly high idiosyncratic risk of relatively young
innovative firms. Economic literature emphasizes that the success of new and
innovative firms is linked to difficult-to-value growth options derived from scientific
knowledge and intellectual property (see Brierley and Kearns 2001). Another key
characteristic is that such firms have little track record and are largely untested in
markets. Against this background, one would expect new firms to add to average
idiosyncratic risk in a sector. The impact should be significant if the number of new
entrants (and their market capitalization) were sufficiently large.
The two timeseries constructed for each sector on the basis of constant (1990)
constituents and actual constituency capture these effects. Table 4 reports the means of
the actual constituents series in the period from October 1998 until December 2001 and
the change compared to the constant constituents mean. In the United States, the index,
including new constituents, shows a significantly higher average firm-level volatility for
all new economy sectors, and for retail and oil and gas. In Europe, volatility is
significantly higher only in the case of software (which includes Internet companies)
and telecom firms and in the automobile sector (with new constituents in the latter case
actually reducing volatility). However, it should be noted that the change in
constituency, although significant, only explains part of the total increase in volatility in
these industries. Therefore, the question remains about the possible role of IT for the
increase of risk for the ‘established’ firms.8
One variable that could capture IT-related changes is the share of intangible assets in
total assets. The accumulation of intangible assets can reflect the impact of IT
innovation both on the production process and on market structure and competition. As
regards the former, computer-related intangible assets ideally capture computer related
investment on organizational change (Brynjolfsson and Yang 1999). Examples include
capitalized adjustment costs, software, new business practices and other complementary
organizational innovations to exploit benefits of computer technology. Related to
market structure changes are capitalized advertising costs and goodwill. For example,
goodwill from takeover activity could rise because IT involves supply-side and demand-
side economies of scale (network effects) that favour business strategies trying to gain
market share or to establish industry standards. Examples are the Internet and the
telecom sector where firms followed an aggressive acquisition strategy in the late
1990s.
Finally, a rising share of intangibles could also affect idiosyncratic risk by reducing the
quality of firm-specific information. One source of volatility could be difficulties in
measuring the value of intangible assets. Many intangibles lack market prices. In
addition, accounting rules and conventions do not correctly capture all the firm’s
productive assets, namely intangible assets associated with the use of IT because they
are accounted for as immediate expenses (Brynjolfsson and Yang 1999). Firm valuation
could also be challenged by factor complementarities involved in the use of intangibles.
For example, the value of a customer list depends on the ability of the firm’s marketing
to translate this information into sales and profits.
These conceptual shortcomings have also to be borne in mind when employing
empirical measures of intangibles. Here, the ratio of intangible assets for the individual
sectors is calculated as the average of intangible assets as percentage of total assets,
weighted by the total assets of each firm. Intangible assets include goodwill, patents,
copyrights, trademarks, formulae, franchises of no specific duration, capitalized
software development costs and computer programmes, organizational costs, customer
lists, licenses of no specific duration, capitalized and purchased servicing rights.
Figure 3 shows the share of intangible assets for the established firms (ie the 1990 index
constituents) in different old and new economy industries. During the 1990s, intangibles
particularly in the form of goodwill became much more important in the telecom sectors
in the United States and in Europe, in the software industry (partly reflecting the
buoyant takeover activity mentioned earlier), and in the retail business.
Finally, we look at intangibles and the shift in idiosyncratic risk in the late 1990s. If
there were difficulties in valuing intangibles that increase firm-specific volatility and if
there was a change in financial markets’ perception of risk, then the magnitude of the
volatility increase should be positively related to the share of intangibles. Figure 4 plots
the percentage increase in idiosyncratic risk for established firms and their average
share of intangible assets.
The pattern for the United States and for Europe is quite different. In Europe, two
groups of industries can be identified. One is established firms in the IT sector, for
which idiosyncratic risk roughly doubled irrespective of the share of intangibles. The
other (small) group consists of established ‘old’ economy firms with a low share of
intangibles and a moderate increase in idiosyncratic risk. For the United States, the
moderate increase in idiosyncratic risk for ‘old’ software firms is striking despite a9
relatively large share of intangibles. On the other extreme, volatility jumped for firms in
the telecom sector. One explanation for this pattern could be that valuation uncertainties
are more important if the accumulation of intangibles goes hand in hand with a
fundamental change in a firm’s business model. This was, for example, the case in the
telecom sector in Europe, where the national incumbents aggressively expanded into
new markets as third generation mobile phone services.
4 Implications for financial policy
The general challenge for financial policy in the face of a technological shock is to
strike the right balance between exploiting potential gains and avoiding risks that in the
extreme could threaten the stability of the overall system. Dealing with the financial risk
associated with technological innovation is important because, on the one hand, the
availability of risk-bearing external finance is one precondition for the implementation
and dissemination of innovation. On the other hand, insufficient understanding and
management of these risks can be costly in terms of wealth losses and possibly financial
instability.
To the extent that higher idiosyncratic risk is attributable to the adoption of new
technologies that involve higher risk, the need increases for financial contracts that
provide for a close monitoring of these risks and that facilitate their dispersion across
the economy. Dealing with these risks requires adequate techniques for evaluating
individual firms (perhaps including quite extreme assumptions about possible changes
in business risk), as well as sufficient risk-bearing capacity of investors and corporate
control mechanisms that create incentives to employ new technologies. Different
combinations of financial institutions and markets can basically perform these
functions. But the character of these intermediation services is such that they
increasingly tend to include equity-like elements (Committee on the Global Financial
System 2002). However, the proper design of such instruments and markets is not
trivial.
The boom and bust cycle of global IT equity markets highlights some of the issues
involved. Total wealth losses on IT equities amounted to about 6 trillion US dollar by
the end of 2001 (see Figure  5). On the positive side, the huge loss in equity wealth did
not trigger any major default among financial intermediaries, and the financial system
showed considerable resilience. Generally, this suggests that markets provided for an
allocation of risks to those sectors that were able to bear them. One aspect of this was
the ability to absorb losses through sufficiently high equity. Taking into account that
idiosyncratic risk made up for the bulk of volatility in total returns, risk diversification
was presumably another important factor in avoiding financial instability. Risk
diversification included the dispersion of exposures in the portfolios of institutional
investors, but possibly also the diffusion of IT sector-related credit exposures through
credit risk transfer markets.
On the other side, the boom and bust of IT equities demonstrated the challenges that
innovation may pose to equity markets. Valuation problems have been substantial and
do probably, as argued earlier, at least partly reflect issues with respect to the quality of
information provided to financial markets. In the late 1990s, these issues were probably
exacerbated by market practices and institutional settings that might not have dealt10
appropriately with the specific information and valuation problems that characterize
new and innovative firms. One example may be incentives to bring firms to the public
equity market at a very early stage of the corporate life cycle. Another example may be
the creation of exchanges for equities of new and innovative firms without having in
place adequate mechanisms or standards for the provision of information about these
firms or without a sufficiently broad investor base that has the capabilities to analyse
information and to monitor firms.
The proper functioning of the equity market appears even more important as conditions
in equity markets had considerable knock-on effects for other segments of the financial
system (Committee on the Global Financial System 2002). They impacted adversely on
the provision of venture capital and private equity to high-tech firms. The drop in equity
market capitalization also reduced the willingness of banks and other financial
institutions to provide new finance to these sectors, as the validity of earlier assumptions
about the ease of refinancing existing debt finance through equity markets was
undermined.
5 Conclusion
This paper calculates idiosyncratic risk based on the return of individual equities. The
results provide evidence of an increase in idiosyncratic risk in the 1990s, namely of a
sharp rise in firm-level volatility since autumn 1998. This pattern is directly attributable
to IT insofar as a substantial part of it reflects high volatility of firms in the IT sector,
and in particular that of new firms in the sector. However, it is not clear whether the
increase in idiosyncratic risk results from changes in the risk perception of financial
markets or from new ways of firm organization, production and competition related to
IT. The jump in volatility in 1998 supports the view that the perception of risk by equity
investors has changed. Finally, the positive relation between the share of intangible
assets (as a proxy for IT-related changes) and the increase in firm-specific risk in the
1990s is consistent with the view that IT increases uncertainty with respect to firm
valuation, particularly if associated with a fundamental change in the business model.
This paper is clearly only a first step and its conclusions are tentative. Future work will
include (1) broadening the scope of the sectors analysed; (2) improving the database, for
example by extending the sample and by including additional explanatory variables that
capture factors as changes in corporate governance or changes in firms’ leverage;
(3)  further develop the methodology, ideally by including fundamental factors in a
multi-factor asset pricing model. Areas for further research include the actual portfolio
implications of changes in idiosyncratic risk and measures of idiosyncratic credit risk.11
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Memo item: Equity prices (Jan 1990 = 100)
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1 Monthly annualised volatilities constructed from equation 17.
Chart 2
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Software & computer services     
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Information technology & hardware
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1 Intangible assets as a percentage of total assets.
Chart 3
United States Europe (EU-15)






























Oil   
Softw 
Retail
Pharm  Infoh 
Autmb 
Telcm 
Share of intangible assets2 Share of intangible assets2
Note: Autmb = Automobiles and parts; Infoh = information technology, hardware; Oil = oil and gas; Pharm = Pharmaceuticals
and biotechnology; Retail = Retailers, general; Softw = Software and computer services; Telcm = Telecom services.
1 Average increase in idiosyncratic risk in 1999 - 2001 compared to 1990 - 1998; in percentages.   2 Intangible assets as
a percentage of total assets, weighted average of the firms in the industry.
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1 Weekly averages, 1 Jan 1998 = 100.   2 Telecom services, media and information technology.   2 Cumulative quarterly changes
for the periods January 1998 to March 2000 and April 2000 to December 2001, in trillions of US dollars. 
Source: Datastream.
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Pharma and biotech 10.2 83 9.1 75
Information technology, hardware 9.7 73 3.8 35
Banks 9.1 78 16.3 148
Information technology, software 6.1 42 1.9 77
Retail 5.7 46 2.1 44
Oil and gas 5.6 51 8.5 49
Telecom services 4.5 13 10.6 52
Insurance 4.2 21 5.5 53
Media 2.7 53 3.8 73
Auto and parts 1.0 26 2.0 39
Total market (11,661) (b 996 (6,212) (b 2,055
Notes: (a Datastream level 4 sector indices. Shares in market capitalization and number of firms as of
end-2001;
(b Market capitalization in billion US$.
Table 2
Trends in idiosyncratic risk – descriptive statistics and regression results
United States Europe
Parameter Market Industry Firm Market Industry Firm
Mean 2.498 2.593 11.964 2.692 1.619 9.436
as % of total return vola 14.22 15.29 70.48 17.30 10.79 71.91
Standard deviation 2.543 2.302 8.888 3.281 1.572 5.988
Model I: Time trend
TREND 2.49 2.99 12.91 2.15 1.91 6.79
SE (0.37) (0.15) (0.56) (0.52) (0.40) (0.83)
R
2 adj 0.24 0.39 0.43 0.52 0.40 0.32
Model II: Time trend and structural break
TREND 2.05 9.57
SE (0.22) (1.51)
BREAK 2.45 1.92 9.93 2.94 2.24 7.69
SE (0.34) (0.34) (1.42) (0.45) (0.16) (0.65)
R
2 adj 0.27 0.50 0.58 0.23 0.59 0.51
Model III: Time trend and cyclical fluctuation
CYCLE 0.12 0.11 0.46 0.0001
SE (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.00004)
TREND 1.89 8.93
SE (0.20) (0.76)
BREAK 2.81 2.23 8.03 0.15
SE (0.18) (0.33) (1.21) (0.02)
R
2 adj 0.32 0.58 0.61 0.62
Note:  Means and standard deviations are annualized monthly figures and multiplied by 100. The trend
coefficient is multiplied by 10
5, the break coefficient is multiplied by 10
3.18
Table 3
Average idiosyncratic risk of firms in different sectors*
United States Europe
Industry w beta mean SD trend break w beta mean SD trend break
Pharmaceutical 10.9 0.95 7.20 7.10 – 8,57 5.1 0.84 7.04 4.68 – 5.69
Telecom 4.6 0.89 6.83 6.52 0.04 7.08 9.9 1.28 8.37 6.07 – 8.50
Banks 9.5 1.01 5.55 3.04 -0.04 3.74 14.2 1.06 8.40 4.71 – 2.15
Hardware 11.1 1.60 14.08 9.94 0.06 8.58 3.6 1.65 9.25 7.11 – 7.79
Software 6.6 1.55 16.49 11.18 – 13.01 1.9 1.32 17.79 16.49 – 18.51
Oil and gas 5.9 0.48 4.50 2.15 – 2.29 8.9 0.73 3.99 1.91 – 1.64
Retail 6.5 1.15 8.93 5.60 – 7.51 2.6 0.87 9.55 9.45 – 8.43
Insurance 4.9 0.76 4.76 2.40 – 2.65 6.2 1.08 6.85 3.84 – 2.94
Media 2.8 0.89 8.21 5.49 – 7.59 3.7 1.01 9.34 7.51 – 10.02
Auto 1.1 0.89 5.04 2.97 – 3.75 2.9 1.04 8.18 3.78 – 1.39
Note: *Annualized monthly volatilities for January 1990 to December 2001. Mean and SD = *102,
annualized. Structural break and trend coefficient = * 103.
Table 4
Effect of changes in sector constituency on idiosyncratic risk
United States Europe
mean(a % (b Fn new nold mean (a % (b Fn new nold
Auto 8.318 +11.0 1.11 5 9 9.091 -18.3 4.80** 11 32
Banks 6.076 +1.5 0.02 8 59 9.990 -1.0 0.01 51 87
Hardware 25.469 +25.8 4.43** 42 51 15.676 +7.6 0.28 23 13
Insurance 7.076 +14.7 1.75 18 27 9.280 -3.9 0.09 17 42
Media 14.851 +25.1 5.08** 19 20 17.994 16.2 1.55 47 46
Oil and gas 6.501 +15.6 2.92* 14 25 5.287 10.6 1.24 14 25
Pharmaceutical 14.700 +44.4 5.43** 30 21 11.920 +7.5 0.35 31 16
Retail 15.500 +1.1 11.7** 18 28 16.834 +1.1 0.00 39 41
Software 27.868 +58.1 12.2** 39 22 33.961 +43.8 5.75** 90 21
Telecom 15.262 +55.2 16.7** 10 12 15.598 +26.4 5.46** 39 9
Notes: (a Calculated as average annualized volatility of the all constituents series from
Oct 1998-Dec 2001;
(b Percentage by which the mean of all constituents series exceeds the mean of the constant
constituent series. * = 10% significance level, ** = 5% significance level. nnew = number of
new constituents. nold = number of constituents by January 1990.